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The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a
Right to Member Derivative Suits
Nonprofit corporations are an increasingly important part of the American
economy. Although they control a "staggering"'1 amount of wealth, nonprofit
corporations have received far less attention from scholars, courts, and legisla-
tures than "for-profit" corporations. 2 In most states, including North Carolina,
an important legal mechanism for discouraging mismanagement on the part of
corporate directors and officers-the right to bring a derivative suit-is not
given members of nonprofit corporations.
3
Under existing law in North Carolina and most other states, a member who
suspects that a nonprofit corporation director or officer has breached a duty to
the corporation either must prevail on the directors to sue on behalf of the cor-
poration or bring his complaint to the Attorney General's attention.4 When the
directors are benefitting from the wrongdoing and the Attorney General's office
is unresponsive, there is no redress for a wrong to the corporation. This Note
examines the basis of derivative suits and analyzes the desirability of recognizing
a right for members of nonprofit corporations in North Carolina to bring such
suits. It concludes that recognition of such a right would provide a valuable
means of supervising the management of many of the state's nonprofit
corporations. 5
A nonprofit corporation by definition is organized for a purpose other than
the direct pecuniary gain of its incorporators or members. 6 Unlike for-profit
1. Henn & Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law of Nonprofit Organizations: California, Here We
Camel, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1103, 1104 n.3 (1981). One commentator has estimated that there are
now at least as many nonprofit corporations as "for-profit" corporations in the United States. H.
OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 4 (4th ed. 1980). Non-
profit corporations are increasing in number. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 608-09 (1984); H. OLECK, supra, at 5-6; Tivnan, Foundations: A Time for Review,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 135.
2. Henn & Boyd, supra note 1, at 1106-07. This Note will refer to general business corpora-
tions as "for-profit" corporations to distinguish them from nonprofit corporations. A for-profit cor-
poration is organized for the pecuniary profit of its shareholders, although it may never in fact earn
profits. See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 68 (rev.
perm. ed. 1983); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 1, at 2-3 (3d ed. 1983).
Conversely, a nonprofit corporation may earn profits, but is forbidden to distribute them to its mem-
bers. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
3. See H. OLECK, supra note 1, at 1149-50; see also Goshien, Relocation of Publicly Supported
Charitable Organizations, 19 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 316 (1970) (discussing supervision of charitable
nonprofit corporations). This Note will refer to those participating in for-profit corporations as
"shareholders," while referring to participants in nonprofit corporations as "members."
4. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
5. Legislation amending North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 55A-1 to -89.1 (1982), to provide procedures for derivative suits by members and directors has
been proposed by the General Statutes Commission and introduced in the General Assembly. H.
939, 1st Sess. (1985).
6. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68. The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act of the Ameri-
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corporations, nonprofit corporations cannot distribute profits or net income to
their members, officers, or directors7 and are prohibited from issuing shares of
stock or paying dividends to those who have contributed capital.8 All income
must be retained and used to advance the purpose of the corporation.9 Directors
or officers of such a corporation may receive only reasonable compensation for
services they render to the corporation.1° This broad definition allows a wide
variety of associations to incorporate as nonprofits, including organizations for
charitable or altruistic purposes,11 religious groups, social clubs, and home-
owner associations. 
12
Today most states have statutes that deal explicitly with nonprofit corpora-
can Bar Association and American Law Institute defines a nonprofit corporation as "a corporation
no part of the income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors or officers."
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 2 (1980), reprinted in 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2,
§ 2.75 [hereinafter cited as MODEL AT].
7. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(c); see 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68; H. OLECK, supra
note 1, at 17; Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 501
(1981).
8. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68.
9. Id. Many states permit distribution of assets to members upon dissolution. North Caro-
lina's Nonprofit Corporation Act authorizes distribution to members upon dissolution of the corpo-
ration if the corporation's charter or by-laws so provide. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-45(4) (1982).
Assets received subject to limitations on their use, such as donations for a specific charitable purpose,
must upon dissolution be transferred or conveyed to an organization "engaged in activities substan-
tially similar to those of the dissolving corporation." Id. § 55A-45(3). This provision is a variation
of the equitable doctrine of cy pres, which allows a court to order that charitable trust funds be
applied in a manner different from-but as close as possible to-the settlor's express directions when
accomplishment of the original purpose of the trust has become impossible or impracticable. G.G.
BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRuSTS § 147 (5th ed. 1973); M. FREMONT-
SMrrH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 31-34, 127-28 (1965); Haskell, The University as Trustee,
17 GA. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1982).
10. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68; Hansmann, supra note 7, at 501.
11. A founder can organize a charity either as a charitable trust or a nonprofit corporation. J.
DUKEMINIER & S. JoHANSON, supra note 1, at 608. Approximately two-thirds of all charities are
organized as corporations. Id. at 608-09. According to Professor Haskell, the corporate form is
preferred more by charities that operate an organization such as a hospital, school, or church than
charities that invest money to subsidize charitable undertakings. P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE
LAW OF TRUSTS 77 (1975). The corporate form protects trustees of charitable organizations from
the harsh rules of personal liability in contract and tort actions. See id. at 130-34; see generally
Henn & Pfeifer, Nonprofit Groups" Factors Influencing Choice of Form, I1 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
181 (1975) (discussing factors to be weighed by a nonprofit group choosing its form and recom-
mending that most groups give serious consideration to incorporation).
12. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 7 (rev. ed. 1946). The Model Non-
Profit Corporation Act provides that a nonprofit corporation may be organized:
for any lawful purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or more of
the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic;
political; religious; social; fraternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agricultural; horti-
cultural; animal husbandry; and professional, commercial, industrial or trade association;
but labor unions, cooperative organizations, and organizations subject to any of the provi-
sions of the insurance laws of this State may not be organized under this Act.
MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 4.
Schemes for classifying nonprofit corporations can be complex. Hansmann, supra note 7, at
502-04, for example, places nonprofit corporations into four categories according to whether the
corporation receives most of its income from donations and contributions or from charging for the
services it provides and whether the corporation is controlled by its donors or by a centralized group
of managers. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5.000-10.841 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985) (California Non-
profit Corporation Law divides nonprofit corporations into three categories according to purpose:
mutual benefit, religious, or public benefit.).
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tions. 13 Many of these acts are based on the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act
of the American Bar Association and American Law Institute. 14 Despite the
proliferation of statutes governing nonprofits, the law of nonprofit corporations
is considerably less developed than the law of for-profit corporations. 15 This
relative lack of development is due in part to the close relationship between
charitable nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts.1 6 Because of the similar-
ities between charitable trusts and charitable corporations, courts fashioning
rules for charitable corporations frequently borrow from the law of trusts when
the state has no nonprofit statute or when its statute is silent on the matter at
issue. 17
The law pertaining to charitable nonprofits-and with it the law of non-
profit corporations in general-thus evolved into a hybrid of corporate and trust
principles.18 For example, courts have disagreed over the duty of loyalty to
which directors of nonprofit corporations should be held. A trustee traditionally
is held to a higher loyalty standard than a director of a for-profit corporation. 19
When the conduct of a nonprofit's director is in question, some courts apply a
13. See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 2.65 (listing states having such statutes).
14. North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-1 to -89.1 (1982) is
among the state acts based on the Model Act. R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE 5 n.1 (3d ed. 1983). As of 1983, 37 other states had enacted nonprofit corpora-
tion acts based on the Model Act. See I W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 2.65. The Model Non-Profit
Corporation Act was approved in 1952 and currently is being revised. H. HE.NN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 2, § 1, at 3 n.4.
15. See Lesher, The Non-profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22 Bus.
LAv. 951, 951 (1967).
16. Whereas a private trust may be established to benefit one or more individuals, a charitable
trust is created to accomplish a "substantial" benefit to a reasonably large portion of the public.
G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, § 54. A charitable trust also must advance one of
several judicially recognized charitable purposes, which include the relief of poverty, the advance-
ment of religion, the advancement of health, the advancement of government purposes, and other
purposes of benefit to the community. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 63
S.E.2d 786 (1951); Haskell, supra note 9, at 3. If the trust serves one of these purposes, it need not
benefit directly a large group, because it will benefit indirectly the entire community. Thus, a trust to
provide college scholarships to only a few people each year is a valid charitable trust because it
advances education and benefits the community as a whole. 1. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra
note 1, at 588.
A charitable nonprofit corporation may be established to serve one of the recognized purposes
of a charitable trust. P. HASKELL, supra note 11, at 78. A corporation also may be considered
"charitable" by the public although it serves a purpose other than those considered charitable under
trust law. Id.
17. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 41; Note, The Charitable Corporation, 64 HARv.
L. REv. 1168, 1168 (1951).
18. According to one court, "the charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity which
does not fit neatly into the established common law categories of corporation and trust." Stem v.
Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013
(D.D.C. 1974); see Note, supra note 17, at 1168. Confusion has been furthered by the decisions of
some courts that a charitable corporation holds its assets in trust for the benefit of the community.
See cases cited in Haskell, supra note 9, at 4 n.l1. Another source of confusion is the practice of
designating directors of charitable corporations as "trustees." See Note, supra note 17, at 1168-69.
19. The duty of loyalty applied to trustees precludes self-dealing. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BO-
GERT, supra note 9, § 543; P. HASKELL, supra note 11, at 98-102; Note, The Fiduciary Duties of
Loyalty and Care Associated With the Directors and Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64 VA. L.
REV. 449, 451-52 (1978). Self-dealing by a director of a for-profit corporation, however, generally is
valid if approved by a majority of the shareholders acting with full disclosure, if approved by a
disinterested majority of the board of directors upon full disclosure, or if the transaction is fair. H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 637-44; Note, supra, at 452-53.
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trust standard of loyalty2 ° or another standard stricter than that applicable to a
business corporation director.
2 1
The rights of members of nonprofit corporations also are somewhat uncer-
tain. The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act defines a "member" as "one hav-
ing membership rights in a corporation in accordance with the provisions of its
articles of incorporation or by-laws."'22 The Act also provides that members
may be given voting rights, including the right to elect directors.23 Under the
Act a corporation may have no members or may have members with no voting
rights; in either case the directors have sole voting power. 24 The designation of
members with voting rights is particularly convenient when those contributing
to the organization are likely to expect a voice in corporate management, as with
nonprofit organizations such as social clubs and homeowner associations, which
20. See, eg., Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 723-24, 49 N.E.2d 220, 223
(1943).
21. See, eg., Mountain Top Youth Camp, Inc. v. Lyon, 20 N.C. App. 694, 202 S.E.2d 498
(1974). In Lyon the court held that self-dealing by a charitable corporation's directors or officers is
not automatically void. Id. at 697, 202 S.E.2d at 500. Although it can be ratified by the corporation,
the transaction is void per se when there has been no disclosure, and the directors or officers may not
raise a defense of fairness. But see Fowle Memorial Hosp. Co. v. Nicholson, 189 N.C. 44, 49, 126
S.E. 94, 97 (1925) (applying for-profit corporation standard to an allegation of self-dealing on part of
a director of a nonprofit hospital corporation).
Some of the same uncertainty exists about the standard of care to be applied to nonprofit direc-
tors and officers. Under the for-profit corporation standard of care, a director or officer must exer-
cise the care of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances and is given the benefit of
the business judgment rule when transactions result in loss to the corporation. H. HENN & J. ALEX-
ANDER, supra note 2, § 232, at 613, 661-63. A trustee, on the other hand, is held to the standard of
care usually expressed as "that of a prudent man dealing with his own property." G.G. BOGERT &
G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, § 93. The trust standard is stricter in application, and there is no
counterpart to the business judgment rule. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for
Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974); Note, supra note 19, at 453-
54.
Courts have applied the trust standard of care to nonprofit directors. See, e.g., Wellesley Col-
lege v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 49 N.E.2d 220 (1943). There is authority, however, for apply-
ing the same standard of care to nonprofit directors and officers as to for-profit directors and officers.
Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013; Pasley, Non-Profit Corporations-Accountability of Directors and Of-
ficers, 21 Bus. LAw. 621, 638 (1966). Some commentators have argued that because nonprofit
directors often serve without compensation, they should be held to a standard of care even more
lenient than that applied to for-profit directors (such as liability only for gross negligence). See id. at
622-27; Note, supra note 17, at 1174. The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act pro-
vides that the managers of organizations for educational, religious, or charitable purposes shall be
held to the same standard of care as directors of for-profit corporations. UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF
INSTrTUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6, 7A U.L.A. 421 (1978). The Act has been adopted in about half
the states, but not in North Carolina. See id. § 5, 7A U.L.A. at 405. Although the Lyon decision
delineates the standard of loyalty for directors and officers of nonprofit corporations in North Caro-
lina, there is no case law in North Carolina addressing the standard of care for nonprofit corporation
directors.
22. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(f); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-2(7) (1982) (identical
definition of "members").
23. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(0; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-20(c), -32 (1982)
(similar provisions).
24. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(0; see Hansmann, supra note 7, at 502 (noting that most
statutes provide for a self-perpetuating board of directors in the event that a nonprofit corporation
gives its members no voting rights or has no members). North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation
Act also provides that the corporation may have no members, or may have members with no voting
rights. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-29(a) (1982). If there are no members or they cannot vote, the




are organized for the mutual benefit of their members. 25 The designation of
members, however, is not limited to mutual benefit nonprofits.
26
When members of a nonprofit corporation have a right to elect directors
and vote on major corporate matters, they are similar to shareholders. Courts
and legislatures, however, have not extended to members one of the principal
tools shareholders use to oversee corporate managers-the right to bring a deriv-
ative suit against a director or officer.
In a derivative suit, a shareholder sues not on his own rights, but on behalf
of the corporation.27 The shareholder is the nominal plaintiff and the corpora-
tion is the real party in interest.2 8 In a for-profit corporation, a shareholder may
be unable to prevail on the corporation to sue on its own behalf; the wrongdoers
may be in control of the corporation or a majority of the shareholders may be
benefitting from the wrongful acts.29 Even if a shareholder could prevail on the
majority to elect directors who would sue on the corporation's behalf, such an
effort would be expensive and time-consuming for a large, publicly held corpora-
tion.30 Recognizing the potential for an unredressed wrong to the corporation,
courts of equity historically allowed shareholders to sue on behalf of the
corporation:
31
25. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 12, § 7.
26. For example, a charitable nonprofit corporation may designate contributors of a certain
amount as "members" or even "life members." A charitable nonprofit corporation is less likely to
designate members, however, than a mutual benefit nonprofit corporation simply because donors to a
charitable enterprise usually do not expect the right to elect directors and other privileges that gener-
ally are incidents of "membership." When a charitable nonprofit designates donors as members, the
common-law rules on donor standing govern whether members can sue managers. See infra note
114 and cases cited infra note 41. But see cases cited infra note 73.
27. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 5939. The derivative cause of action stems from a wrong
to the corporation as a whole and must be distinguished from a direct cause of action arising from a
wrong to the shareholder. In general, a breach of the membership contract between the shareholder
and the corporation gives rise to an individual or direct cause of action whereas a derivative claim
arises when there has been a breach of a duty owed to the corporation. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 2, § 360, at 1048. This distinction may be difficult to make because performance of the
shareholders' membership contract is one aspect of the duty that management owes the corporation.
Id. § 360, at 1049. Among the claims usually deemed to give rise to direct or individual shareholder
actions are suits to compel payment of declared or mandatory dividends, suits to enforce a right to
inspect corporate books, suits to enforce the right to vote, and suits to enjoin a threatened wrong
before its consummation. Id. In contrast, actions to recover damages from a consummated ultra
vires act and actions to recover damages from directors or officers for mismanagement of the busi-
ness, appropriation of corporate funds or corporate opportunities, sale of control, and other breaches
of duties owed to the corporation all have been held to give rise to a derivative rather than a direct
shareholder action. Id. § 360, at 1049-50.
28. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 5939.
29. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 888 (5th ed.
1980); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 358, at 1036 n.l.
30. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 886.
31. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970). For an early case recognizing a derivative suit
and discussing the rationale behind such a cause of action, see Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1882). Professor Prunty argues that recognition of the derivative suit followed from the application
of two bodies of law to an action by a shareholder: the trust law theory that a director is a trustee for
the shareholders and the doctrine of the "corporate entity," which recognizes that the corporation is
a separate right-holding entity. Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 980, 986-90 (1957). When only the rights of the corporation are at stake, the
shareholder has no individual cause of action and must sue in a derivative or representative capacity.
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As elaborated in the cases, one precondition for the suit was a valid
claim on which the corporation could have sued; another was that the
corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable demand ....
Thus the dual nature of the stockholder's action: first the plaintiff's
right to sue on behalf of the corporation and, second, the merits of the
corporation's claim itself.
32
As derivative suits became more common, they proved subject to abuse by
plaintiffs who sued not to recover on behalf of the corporation but to extract a
lucrative settlement from the corporation. 33 In response courts and legislatures
attempted to curb such "strike suits" by limiting the derivative suit.34 The fol-
lowing requirements were added: that the plaintiff be a shareholder at the time
of the challenged transaction; 35 that the shareholder demand that the directors
bring suit on behalf of the corporation unless such a demand would be futile; 36
that the shareholder post a security bond for the defendants' litigation ex-
penses;37 and that any recovery, including a settlement, go to the corporation
rather than to the individual shareholder.
38
The shareholder derivative suit has become a successful technique for dis-
couraging mismanagement and abuse of fiduciary duties. 39 It has remained,
however, primarily a device for calling managers of for-profit corporations to
account; a similar action generally has not been available against a director or
officer of a nonprofit corporation. Most nonprofit statutes are silent on whether
a member may bring a derivative suit; consequently, the limits on such suits
stem primarily from the common law.4° When members of charitable nonprof-
its have attempted to bring derivative suits, some courts have denied them stand-
ing by analogy to the rule that only the attorney general can sue to enforce
charitable trusts.4 1 Courts also have denied standing to members of noncharita-
32. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970).
33. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 888; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note
2, § 358, at 1039; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741-43 (1975) (even a
plaintiff with a patently groundless claim may extract a settlement from a corporation since the
plaintiff can threaten extensive discovery and disruption of corporate business).
34. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 358, at 1039-40. These limits are unique to the
shareholder derivative action. Id.
35. This provision prevents a plaintiff from buying a cause of action. W. CARY & M. EISEN-
BERG, supra note 29, at 914-17; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 362, at 1048.
36. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 926-27; H. HENN' & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 2, § 365, at 1069-70.
37. This requirement may be limited to shareholders with holdings below a prescribed mini-
mum. If the plaintiff is unsuccessful, he forfeits the bond. According to Henn and Alexander, the
bond requirement saddles an unsuccessful small shareholder with the expenses of both sides of the
litigation--"an awesome and rather unique situation." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2,
§ 372, at 1092.
38. This requirement lessens a plaintiff's motivation to bring a strike suit, but does not lessen
the motivation of a plaintiff's attorney, who may be the actual instigator of the suit and may hope
that the court will allow him generous fees out of any recovery. See id. § 372, at 1093 n.22.
39. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 888.
40. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
41. See, eg., Lopez v. Medford Community Center, 384 Mass. 171, 175, 424 N.E.2d 229, 232
(1981) (only attorney general can initiate judicial proceedings to correct abuses in administration of
public charities); Dillaway v. Burton, 256 Mass. 568, 574, 153 N.E. 13, 16-17 (1926) (member of a
charitable corporation is without standing to sue to enjoin alleged unlawful acts of "trustees" of
corporation because plaintiff's complaint concerns public interest rather than his private interest as a
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ble nonprofit corporations, without distinguishing between the charitable and
noncharitable purposes of the two types of corporations.4 2
During the past twenty years, the New York and California legislatures and
the courts of several other states have reversed the common-law ban on deriva-
tive suits by members of nonprofit corporations. New York's Not-For-Profit
Corporation Law (N-PCL), enacted in 1969, provides that:
An action may be brought in the right of a domestic or foreign corpo-
ration to procure a judgment in its favor by five percent or more of any
class of members or capital certificate holders of record or owners, not
of record, of a beneficial interest in the capital certificates of such
corporation.4 3
The N-PCL is designed to parallel New York's Business Corporation Law
(BCL). 44 Accordingly, the nonprofit derivative suit provisions are modeled after
the BCL provisions for shareholder derivative suits against directors and of-
ficers.4 5 A derivative action under the N-PCL must meet the following require-
ments: the plaintiffs must have been members at the time the action was
brought;4" the complaint must allege with particularity the plaintiffs' efforts to
secure board action prior to suit;47 the action must not be compromised or set-
tled without court approval;48 and the court may award expenses to the plain-
tiffs if the action is successful. 49
The New York N-PCL, however, differs from the BCL derivative suit pro-
member); Voelker v. St. Louis Mercantile Library Ass'n, 359 S.W.2d 689, 694-95 (Mo. 1962) (chari-
table corporation is subject to the principles applicable to charitable trusts, and because a charitable
corporation is organized for benefit of others, its members do not have pecuniary interest analogous
to that of shareholders); Carroll v. City of Beaumont, 18 S.W.2d 813, 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)
(attorney general is the proper party to sue on behalf of a charitable corporation).
The power to enforce a charitable trust, which includes the right to call the trustee to account
for any breach of his fiduciary obligations, historically rested with the attorney general as the repre-
sentative of the public at large. M. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 9, at 198. Unlike the beneficiary of
a private trust, members of the public have been denied the right to sue to enforce a charitable trust
under the rationale that the unlimited grant of this right would expose the trustee to vexatious
lawsuits and overburden the courts. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, Tim LAW OF TRusTs AND
TRusTEEs § 414, at 436 (rev. 2d ed. 1977); M. FREMONT-SMrH, supra note 9, at 87. For a discus-
sion of the the right of a charitable corporation's beneficiaries to bring a derivative suit, see infra note
114.
42. Hansmann, supra note 7, at 606. Hansmann notes that some courts group charitable corpo-
rations within the single category of "charities" and thus should be willing to apply a different
standing rule to noncharitable nonprofits. He notes, however, that "the courts apparently do not
pay much attention to the distinction." Id.
43. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 623(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
44. Henn & Boyd, supra note 1, at 1114; see Joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of
Corporation Laws xvi, in N.Y. NOT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. LAW (McKinney 1970). The correspond-
ing for-profit corporation statute sections are N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1-2001 (McKinney 1963).
45. N.Y. NOT-FoR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 623, note on legislative studies and reports (McKin-
ney 1970).
46. Id. § 623(b) (McKinney 1970). The corresponding BCL provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963).
47. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623(c) (McKinney 1970). The corresponding BCL
provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1963).
48. N.Y. NOT-FoR-PROFrr CORP. LAW § 623(d) (McKinney 1970). The corresponding BCL
provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963).
49. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). The correspond-
ing BCL provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(e) (McKinney 1963).
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visions in three respects. Although section 627 of the BCL requires a share-
holder holding less than five percent of any class of outstanding shares to post
security for "reasonable expenses" incurred by the defendants, 50 the N-PCL
contains no analogous provision. Instead, the N-PCL states that a member de-
rivative action cannot be brought by fewer than five percent of any class of mem-
bers.5 ' The comments to the N-PCL indicate that the drafters believed the five
percent limit was needed in the absence of a security-for-expenses requirement,
presumably to reduce the risk of vexatious litigation.5 2 In addition, the N-PCL
contains no equivalent to the contemporaneous ownership rule.5 3 The drafters
apparently believed that a membership version of the contemporaneous owner-
ship rule-generally a guard against strike suits 54-was unnecessary in light of
the five percent requirement.
55
California's Nonprofit Corporation Law (NCL)5 6 divides nonprofit corpo-
rations into three types-"mutual benefit," "public benefit," and "religious" 57-
and provides for derivative suits by members of "public benefit" and "mutual
benefit" corporations. 58 The NCL parallels the state's provisions for share-
holder derivative suits in many respects. Like the California General Corpora-
tion Law (GCL),5 9 the NCL includes a contemporaneous membership rule6°
and a requirement that the plaintiff allege with particularity his efforts to secure
action by the board.61 The NCL also authorizes the court to grant a defendant's
motion requiring the plaintiff to provide up to $50,000 as security for the defend-
50. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). The plaintiff need not provide
security for expenses if the value of his shares exceeds $50,000. Id.
51. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CoR'. LAW § 623(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
52. Id. § 623, note on legislative studies and reports; Note, New Yorks Not-For-Profit Corpora-
tion Law, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 787-88 (1972). For a criticism of the five percent limit, see Henn
& Boyd, supra note 1, at 1124. Professors Henn and Boyd argue that the five percent requirement is
"overly burdensome" and "likely to stifle many meritorious actions." Id.
53. Section 626(b) of the BCL states that the plaintiff must have been a shareholder "at the
time of the transaction of which he complains, or that his shares or his interest therein devolved
upon him by operation of law." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963).
54. See supra note 35.
55. The "contemporaneous ownership" provision in paragraph (b) of section 626 of the
Bus. Corp. L. has been eliminated in the new law as inappropriate for not-for-profit corpo-
rations, since the likelihood is remote that an interest in such corporations would be
purchased solely for the purpose of initiating a derivative suit.
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFrT CORP. LAW § 623, note on legislative studies and reports (McKinney 1970);
see Henn & Boyd, supra note 1, at 1123 n.158.
56. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-10841 (West Supp. 1985). The statute went into effect in 1980.
Nonprofit Corporation Law, ch. 567, 1978 Cal. Stat. 1740.
57. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5059-5061 (West Supp. 1985). For a discussion of the public policy
and first amendment considerations that caused the drafters to distinguish religious corporations, see
Hone, California's New Nonprofit Corporation Law--An Introduction and Conceptual Background,
13 U.S.F.L. REv. 733 (1979).
58. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5710, 7710 (West Supp. 1985). The statute also provides for deriva-
tive suits by directors of corporations that have no members. Id. §§ 5310(b), 7310(b)(2); see also
infra note 114 (discussing statutory and judicial recognition of the right of directors to bring a deriv-
ative suit).
59. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1-2319 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
60. Id. §§ 5710(b)(1) (public benefit corporations), 7710(b)(1) (mutual benefit corporations),
The corresponding provision of the GCL is id. § 800 (b)(l).
61. Id. §§ 5710(b)(2), 7710(b)(2). The corresponding provision of the GCL is id. § 800(b)(2).
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ant's litigation expenses;62 a corresponding provision is contained in the GCL.
63
Unlike the GCL, the NCL states that no security shall be required if the action
is brought by 100 or more members or by some other "authorized number."
64
Courts in several jurisdictions also recently have recognized the right of
members to bring derivative suits on behalf of nonprofit corporations. In most
of the decisions, the courts have reasoned that common-law precedent giving
shareholders a derivative suit right conferred such a right on members of non-
profit corporations by implication and that this right continues until the state's
legislature, through the corporation laws, expressly denies it. In Bourne v. Wil-
iams 65 the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that members of a property owners
association organized as a nonprofit corporation had standing to sue the direc-
tors for wasting corporate assets for personal gain. The court examined the
"well developed" common law that established a shareholder's right to a deriva-
tive suit and held that "[ilt has. . been established as part of the general law of
corporations that members of nonprofit corporations have the same rights in this
regard as stockholders of corporations for profit."' 66 In response to defendants'
argument that the statute recognizing derivative suits referred only to actions on
behalf of a "corporation for profit,"' 67 the court noted that other sections of the
same chapter used the term "member" and "shareholder" simultaneously.
68
Thus, the statute "clearly indicate[d]. . . that the drafters had in mind a non-
profit corporation, as well as a corporation for profit."
69
Similarly, in Atwell v. Bide-A- Wee Home Association,70 decided by the New
York Supreme Court prior to the effective date of the N-PCL, a member of a
nonprofit homeowner association was held to have standing to sue the direc-
tors.7 1 At the time of the decision the derivative suit provisions of the Business
Corporation Law referred only to shareholders. 72 Because some types of corpo-
rations were excluded expressly from the Business Corporation Law and non-
profit corporations were not among these, the court reasoned that nonprofits
62. Id. §§ 5710(d), 7710(d).
63. Id. § 800(d).
64. Id. §§ 5710(a), 7710(a). Section 5036 defines "authorized number" to be five percent of the
voting power or
[w]here (disregarding any provision for cumulative voting which would otherwise apply),
the total number of votes entitled to be cast for a director is 1,000 or more, but less than
5,000 the authorized number shall be 2-1/2 percent of the voting power, but not less than
50.
Where. . .the total number of votes entitled to be cast for a director is 5,000 or more,
the authorized number shall be one-twentieth of I percent of the voting power, but not less
than 125.
Id. § 5036(b)-(c).
65. 633 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
66. Id. at 471-72.
67. Id. at 472.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 59 Misc. 2d 321, 299 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
71. Id. at 324, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
72. Id. at 323, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
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impliedly were within the statute.73
North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation Act 74 makes no provision for de-
rivative suits by members of nonprofit corporations. It does, however, authorize
the Attorney General to oversee nonprofit corporations under some circum-
stances. Section 55A-50 of the Act grants the Attorney General authority to
bring an action for involuntary dissolution of the corporation 75 on several
grounds, 76 including the ground that the corporation has "continued to exceed
or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law, to the injury of the public, or of
its members, creditors, or debtors. . .. -77 Section 55A-51 imposes a duty on
the Attorney General to bring such an action whenever he has reason to believe
73. Id. at 322-23, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 41; see also Wickes v. Belgian Am. Educ. Found., 266 F.
Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (neither New York nor Delaware law prohibited plaintiffs, who were
members and directors of a charitable nonprofit corporation, from bringing a derivative suit); Valle
v. North Jersey Auto. Club, 125 N.J. Super. 302, 310 A.2d 518 (Ch. Div. 1973) (the word "share-
holder" in the statute recognizing a derivative action included members of nonprofit corporations),
modified, 74 N.J. 109, 376 A.2d 1192 (1977); Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 570, 72 A.2d 371,
377 (Ch. Div. 1950) (members of a charitable nonprofit corporation had standing to bring a deriva-
tive suit because "[t]he same rights and liabilities exist between the trustees of a non-profit corpora-
tion and the members as exist between the directors and stockholders of a corporation for profit").
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-1 to -89.1 (1982). The Act was enacted in 1955 and took effect in
1957. Nonprofit Corporation Act, ch. 1230, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1239. It defines "member" as
"one having membership rights in a corporation in accordance with the provisions of its charter or
bylaws." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-2(7) (1982). The Act also provides that a nonprofit corporation
"may have one or more classes of members or may have no members." Id. § 55A-29(a). If a non-
profit corporation does not have members or does not allow members to vote for directors, the
directors are to be elected or appointed in the manner and for the terms as provided in the bylaws.
Id. § 55A-20(c). Prior to the enactment of this Act, nonprofit corporations in North Carolina were
governed by the provisions of the General Corporation Act. R. RoBINSON, supra note 14, at 5 n.4.
75. An involuntary dissolution is a court-ordered wind-up of the corporation's business affairs
that ends the corporation's legal existence. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 280, at
751-55, § 382, at 1148. In North Carolina the Attorney General may bring an action for involuntary
dissolution of a for-profit corporation on grounds that it: procured its charter by fraud; refuses to
produce books, records, or documents; has abused its authority; or has failed to maintain a registered
agent or office. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-122 (1982). A shareholder may bring such an action on the
following grounds: that the directors are deadlocked; that the shareholders are deadlocked; that the
shareholders have actual notice of written agreement allowing dissolution; or that dissolution is
"reasonably necessary" to protect the interests of the complaining shareholder. Id. § 55-125 (a)(l)-
(4) (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1983). A creditor also can bring an action for involuntary dissolution in
some situations. See id. § 55-125o(b). See generally R. RoaINsoN, supra note 14, at 425-40 (discuss-
ing in detail the grounds and procedures for an involuntary dissolution decree).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-50(1)-(5) (1982). The grounds for involuntary dissolution are:
(1) The corporation procured its charter through fraud; or
(2) The corporation has, after written notice by the Attorney General given at least 20
days prior thereto, continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law, to
the injury of the public, or of its members, creditors, or debtors; or
(3) The corporation has, after written notice by the Attorney General given at least 20
days prior thereto, failed for 30 days to appoint and maintain a registered agent in this
State, as required by G.S. 55A-1 1; or
(4) The corporation has, after written notice by the Attorney General given at least 20
days prior thereto, failed for 30 days after change of its registered office or registered agent
to file in the office of the Secretary of State a statement of such change, as required by G.S.
55A-12; or
(5) The corporation has without justification refused to comply with a final court
order for the production of its books, records, or other documents as required to be kept by
G.S. 55A-27.
77. Id. § 55A-50(2).
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that the case "involves the public interest."7 8 Additionally, the laws governing
trusts and trustees79 give the Attorney General authority to bring an action in
the name of the State against the trustees when "there is reason to believe that
the property has been mismanaged through negligence or fraud" 80 and to ad-
minister a charitable trust should the settlor's intent become impossible to ful-
fill. 8 1 North Carolina has no express statutory provision for member derivative
suits, and North Carolina courts have not yet recognized such a cause of
action.
82
Under existing North Carolina law, members of a nonprofit corporation
who believe management has breached a duty to the corporation have only two
options. They cannot sue in their own right if the injury is to the corporation,
83
but can use their voting power to remove the wrongdoers from office and then
prevail on the corporation to sue the directors or officers to recover damages.
Alternatively, members can report their complaint to the Attorney General's
office which will investigate and, if warranted, bring an enforcement action.
84
These options may limit severely members' ability to redress a wrong to the
corporation. If a majority of the members are indifferent or are benefitting from
the breach of duty, the complaining member may not be able to prevail on the
corporation to sue.85 Limits on the resources of the Attorney General's office
may make it equally unresponsive. Several commentators have argued that state
attorneys general lack both the finances and the incentive to oversee effectively
nonprofit corporation managers.86 In a decision recognizing the right of minor-
ity directors to bring derivative suits on behalf of a charitable corporation, the
California Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Attorney General may not be in a
position to become aware of wrongful conduct or be sufficiently familiar with the
78. Id. § 55A-51.
79. Id. §§ 36A-1 to -115.
80. Id. § 36A-48.
81. Id. § 36A-53(a). North Carolina common law also gives the Attorney General authority to
enforce charitable trusts. See Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 678-
79, 161 S.E.2d 116, 131 (1968); see also Edmisten, The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General
of North Carolina, 9 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1977) (discussing the statutory and common-law
powers of the Attorney General to oversee charitable trusts). See generally Hansmann, supra note 7,
at 600 ("Virtually all states authorize the attorney general, either by common law or by statute, to
ensure that the managers of charitable organizations fulfill their fiduciary obligations.").
Notably absent from North Carolina law are requirements that nonprofit corporations file peri-
odic disclosures with the Attorney General's office. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 486.
82. Apparently, no North Carolina appellate court has addressed whether a member has stand-
ing to bring a derivative suit.
83. See supra note 27.
84. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
86. See Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73
HARV. L. REv. 433, 448-60 (1960); see also M. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 9, at 234 (surveys show
that the attention of attorneys general to the affairs of charitable organizations is "minimal" in many
states); Hansmann, supra note 7, at 601 ("Commonly, little or no staff in the attorney general's office
is assigned to look after the affairs of nonprofits, and no effective system of financial reporting by
nonprofits exists in any state."); Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses, and Abuses: 1970, 19 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 207, 235-36 ("State attorneys-general practically shun investigations of nonprofit
organizations.").
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situation to appreciate its impact."' 87 One commentator who examined attorney
general supervision of charitable associations found it to be "irregular and
infrequent." 88
Recognition by statute or judicial decision of a right for North Carolina
members of nonprofit corporations to bring derivative suits would provide mem-
bers a valuable tool for enforcing the duties directors and officers owe the corpo-
ration. Such a decision would have the obvious advantage of providing
consistency in the state's corporate law; members and shareholders alike would
have the right to bring a derivative suit, and management of both types of corpo-
rations would be subject to similar oversight mechanisms.
Recognition of member derivative suits in North Carolina would not con-
tradict the state's existing corporation laws. The provisions of the Business Cor-
poration Act89 recognizing shareholder derivative suits do not expressly exclude
members. 90 Similarly, although the provision on the applicability of the Busi-
ness Corporation Act states that the Act applies to "every corporation for
profit" and "every corporation not for profit having a capital stock," 91 the Act
does not expressly exclude nonprofit membership corporations.
There also is a common-law basis for member derivative suits in North
Carolina. In 1929 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the corporate
statute providing for distribution of assets to shareholders after dissolution of
the corporation to nonprofit corporation members, despite the absence of any
reference to members in the statute.92 The court held that "'In the case of
nonstock corporations, the members, while not usually denominated stockhold-
ers, are in point of principle stockholders, having an interest in the corporate
property similar to that of stockholders in an ordinary corporation.' -g9
Furthermore, the history of the shareholder derivative suit in North Caro-
lina supports an interpretation that statutory silence on a remedy against man-
agement does not mean that the legislature intended to deny the remedy. North
Carolina General Statutes section 55-55, recognizing shareholder derivative ac-
tions, was not enacted until 1973.94 The common-law right to a shareholder
derivative suit, however, already was well established. 95 In the years between
87. Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 63 Cal. 2d 750, 755, 394 P.2d 932,
935, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247 (1964).
88. Karst, supra note 86, at 437; see also City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 97 N.J.
Super. 514, 527-28, 235 A.2d 487, 495 (Ch. Div. 1967) ("The manifold duties of [the attorney gen-
eral's] office make readily understandable the fact that.. . supervision [by that office] is necessarily
sporadic.").
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to -175 (1982).
90. Id. § 55-55.
91. Id. § 55-3(a).
92. Smith v. Dicks, 197 N.C. 355, 148 S.E. 464 (1929). The suit was brought by a member of a
social and literary club organized as a nonprofit corporation. The lower court held that when the
corporation failed to renew its charter, plaintiff and the other members were vested with an equal,
undivided interest in the club's property. Id. at 359, 148 S.E. at 466. The supreme court affirmed.
Id. at 364, 148 S.E.2d at 469.
93. Id. at 363, 148 S.E. at 468 (quoting RULING CASE LAW (Corporations) § 754 (1920)).
94. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 547-48.
95. See, ag., Coble v. Beall, 130 N.C. 533, 41 S.E. 793 (1902) (recognizing a shareholder's right
to bring a derivative suit, subject to the "one prerequisite" that the plaintiff show in his complaint
1010 [Vol. 63
NONPROFIT DERIVATIVE SUITS
the enactment of the first state corporation law in 185296 and the enactment of
section 55-55 in 1973, the courts apparently did not consider the statutory si-
lence on derivative suits as evidence of legislative intent to bar such suits.
97
A potential drawback to recognition of member derivative suits is that such
a provision may encourage strike suits against nonprofit directors and officers.
Unlike directors of for-profit corporations, nonprofit directors usually work on a
part-time basis without financial compensation.9" If serving on a nonprofit cor-
poration's board subjects the director to the expense and inconvenience of de-
fending spurious lawsuits, there may be few volunteers. Likewise, a nonprofit
corporation's officers, who are allowed reasonable compensation,9 9 may not
wish to serve if one of the incidents of employment is a significant risk of being
named a defendant in a vexatious lawsuit.
To minimize a nonprofit director's or officer's exposure to vexatious litiga-
tion, the right of members to bring derivative suits should be limited in much the
same way that shareholder deriviative suits are limited. The California and New
York statutes include in their provisions for member derivative suits most of the
limits applied to shareholder derivative suits. 100 In North Carolina, the right to
a shareholder derivative suit under section 55-55 is limited by the following: a
contemporaneous ownership rule; 10 1 a requirement that the plaintiff allege a de-
mand on the directors; 10 2 a requirement that any compromise or settlement
have court approval;10 3 and a provision that the court may require the plaintiff
to pay defendant's attorney's fees if the court finds that the action was brought
without "reasonable cause."' 1 4 The last provision reverses the common-law re-
luctance to grant such relief, even when the defendant was successful, unless the
defense in some way benefitted the corporation.' 05
The North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act also provides that a direc-
tor or officer of a nonprofit corporation is entitled to indemnification for defend-
ing an action alleging dereliction of a duty if his defense is successful. 10 6 Even if
a director or officer has been found liable for breach of a duty to the corporation,
the court may award indemnification if it finds that "such person has acted hon-
that he made a demand on the directors to bring the action and that they refused to do so); see also
R. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 213 (comparing North Carolina case law on derivative suits with
that of other states).
96. R. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 1. The North Carolina legislature first enacted a statute
permitting organization of private corporations without a legislative charter in 1795, but the first
statute authorizing the organization of corporations for a wide range of business purposes was not
enacted until 1852. Id.
97. See, ag., Fulton v. Talbert, 255 N.C. 183, 120 S.E.2d 410 (1961) ("[W]here. . . an officer
of a corporation so utilizes his authority as to benefit himself to the detriment of the corporation, a
right of action accrues to the corporation.").
98. H. OLECK, supra note 1, at 612.
99. See supra text accompanying note 10.
100. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text; notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55(a) (1982).
102. Id. § 55-55(b).
103. Id. § 55-55(c).
104. Id. § 55-55(e).
105. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 378, at 1115-16.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17.3(a)(1) (1982).
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estly and reasonably and that, in view of all the circumstances of the case, his
conduct fairly and equitably merits such relief."' 10 7 This provision, if interpreted
broadly for member derivative suits, could reduce greatly the financial risks that
strike suits pose for nonprofit directors. That a nonprofit director works without
compensation and on a part-time basis should be a relevant "circumstance" for
determining whether his conduct was "reasonable." If these existing limits on
shareholder derivative suits and provisions for indemnification of nonprofit di-
rectors and officers are extended to member derivative suits, the risk of strike
suits probably will not discourage individuals from serving as nonprofit officers
or directors.
108
Another objection to the recognition of member derivative suits is that
members lack sufficient interest in the corporation to sue on its behalf. A share-
holder's pecuniary interest in the corporation is part of the basis of his right to
bring a derivative suit; when the corporation will not sue on a valid claim, the
shareholder's equity interest is imperiled and thus he is entitled to sue deriva-
tively. 109 Although a member may have no equity interest in a nonprofit corpo-
ration, he usually has a significant pecuniary interest in the organization.
Membership often is conditioned on the payment of dues. 110 Furthermore, in
the case of a homeowner association the decisions of the directors and officers
may affect the value of each member's property.
A member does not expect the same return on his money as an investor in
shares of stock, but he expects that his money will be used in the manner repre-
sented to him when he became a member. Apart from a concern over vexatious
litigation, there is no compelling reason why this pecuniary interest should be
insufficient to justify a derivative suit by a member. Of course, because section
55A-29(a) of the Act allows nonprofit incorporators to define membership as
they choose, 1 the corporation might have members with no financial stake.
Should the prospect of derivative litigation by such members trouble the incor-
porators, they could frame the bylaws or charter to condition membership on
some form of financial contribution or to have no members at all.1 12
107. Id. § 55A-17.3(a)(2). The Act also provides that a nonprofit corporation may expand the
statutory indemnification provisions in its bylaws or charter. See id. § 55A-17.1(a); R. ROnINSON,
supra note 14, at 238 n.27.
108. See supra note 33. The Nonprofit Corporation Act also expressly gives nonprofit corpora-
tions power "to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17.1(c) (1982).
109. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
110. See Henn & Pfeifer, supra note 11, at 185 n.10; Pasley, Organization and Operation of Non.
Profit Corporations-Some General Considerations, 19 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 239, 248 (1970); see also
Lopez v. Medford Community Center, Inc., 384 Mass. 171, 173 & n.5, 174, 424 N.E.2d 229, 231 &
n.5, 232 (1982) (trial court's findings of fact included charter provision that membership in defend-
ant charitable corporation was conditioned on payment of annual dues).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-29(a) (1982).
112. To discourage nonprofit corporations from choosing not to have members solely because of
the possibility of a derivative suit, the proposed amendment to the North Carolina Nonprofit Corpo-
ration Act would recognize derivative actions by directors as well as members. See supra note 5. See
Minutes of Nonprofit Corporation Act Drafting Committee of the North Carolina General Statutes
Commission (Sept. 20, 1984). See generally infra note 114 (discussing statutory recognition in other
jurisdictions of derivative suits by directors).
As noted earlier, a charitable corporation may designate as "members" donors with no voice in
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The existing provisions for supervision of nonprofit corporations in North
Carolina are inadequate. Commentators and those state courts and legislatures
that have considered the issue have concluded that supervision by the attorney
general's office is likely to be sporadic and ineffective.1 13 When a nonprofit cor-
poration has been wronged but a member cannot prevail on the directors to sue
on behalf of the corporation, the member may be without recourse. To correct
this problem, the North Carolina legislature or the state courts should recognize
the right of members of nonprofit corporations to bring a derivative suit on be-
half of the corporation. 1 4 Such a provision would be consistent with North
the affairs of the corporation. To avoid the prospect of derivative suits by such honorary members, a
statute recognizing member derivative suits also could provide that a "member" must be given some
voice in the corporation's affairs, such as the right to elect directors or vote on changes in the charter
and bylaws. The California Nonprofit Corporation Law limits members in this fashion. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 5056 (West Supp. 1985). Such a provision would require a charitable corporation to bestow
a title other than "member" on donors it wanted to recognize but not give a voice in the operation of
the corporation.
113. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
114. A court or legislature recognizing a right for members to bring a derivative suit should
consider other means of improving the supervision of nonprofit corporations as well. In the New
York and California statutes, the provision for member derivative suits was accompanied by ex-
panded powers for the attorney general's office. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983). Another option is to give
directors a right to bring a derivative suit. The California Nonprofit Corporation Law authorizes
directors to bring derivative suits if the corporation has no members. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5059-
5061 (West Supp. 1985). In New York, where the Business Corporation Law authorizes derivative
suits by directors of for-profit corporations, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 720(b) (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1984), it has been held that the director or officer must have held his corporate office at the
time the derivative suit was commenced, a requirement analogous to the contemporaneous owner-
ship limitation on shareholder derivative suits. Alan v. Landau-Alan Gallery, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 350,
320 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1971); see 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at § 5972. For a pre-1980 California
decision recognizing the right of directors of a nonprofit corporation to bring derivative suits, see
Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 63 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr.
244 (1964).
The donors or beneficiaries of a charitable nonprofit corporation also could be given standing.
Hansmann, supra note 7, at 607-09, argues that a charitable corporation's donors and beneficiaries
are more likely than any other parties to take an interest in the corporation's affairs and thus may be
proper parties to bring suit. There is some historical basis for giving donors standing; founding
donors of a charitable trust were given a right of "visitation" over the trust, including the right to
inspect the trustees' actions and correct abuses. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 206;
Hansmann, supra note 7, at 607-09. This right, however, has fallen into disfavor and donors today
commonly are denied standing to sue. Hansmann, supra note 7, at 607; see also Shields v. Harris,
190 N.C. 520, 130 S.E. 189 (1925) (heirs of the settlor of a charitable trust do not have standing to
sue for enforcement of the trust). The rationale for this denial usually is either that the donor's legal
interest ends once he makes the gift to the corporation or that potential suits by charitable donors
would expose charitable corporation managers to a risk of excessive liability. Hansmann, supra note
7, at 607-09; Karst, supra note 86, at 447.
Under trust law, beneficiaries of a charitable trust generally were denied standing to sue unless
they could show a "special interest" in the benefits of the trust, beyond the benefit conferred on the
public at large. M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 86-87; see also supra note 41 (discussing
denial of a public right to enforce a charitable trust). The same principle has been applied to deny
standing to beneficiaries of a charitable corporation who could not show a "special interest." City of
Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 97 N.J. Super. 514, 527, 235 A.2d 487, 495 (Ch. Div. 1967).
Recent decisions in some states have expanded the right of beneficiaries of a charitable trust or
corporation to bring a derivative suit or to sue to enforce the trust. See, eg., Ster v. Lucy Webb
Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973) (pa-
tients of a hospital organized as a charitable corporation have standing to sue the management);
Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977) (students, staff, and faculty of a college operated as a
charitable trust have standing to sue the trustees). A recent decision by the North Carolina Supreme
Court on beneficiary standing is Kania v. Chatham, 297 N.C. 290, 254 S.E.2d 528 (1979). In Kania
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Carolina case law recognizing the similarities between members and sharehold-
ers. The threat of strike suits could be reduced by limiting members' suits as
shareholder derivative suits are limited in the existing Business Corporation Act
and by enforcing indemnification provisions of the nonprofit act. Finally, be-
cause the right of shareholders to bring a derivative suit against business corpo-
ration managers is well established in North Carolina, a statute giving members
a right to bring such an action would provide consistency in the state's corpora-
tion law and would fulfill members' expectations.
BRENDA BOYKIN
a nominee for a college scholarship sued the trustees of the charitable trust that provided the schol-
arship program. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit because mere nomina-
tion for a scholarship did not give him a "special interest." Id. at 292, 254 S.E.2d at 530. In the
absence of such an interest, the court held, the proper party to sue for enforcement of a charitable
trust is the attorney general. Id. at 292-93, 254 S.E.2d at 530.
As with donors, one reason frequently given for denying standing to beneficiaries is a fear of
exposing trustees or directors to excessive liability. This fear may be unfounded. Hansmann notes
that a Wisconsin statute adopted in 1945 permitted any 10 or more donors or beneficiaries of a
charitable trust to bring a suit to enforce the trust. The statute later was replaced, but there are no
reported cases in which donors or beneficiaries brought such a suit. Hansmann, supra note 7, at 609-
10.
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